Thursday, April 10, 2025

Victory over inflation now seems so yesterday

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Today's Points:

Who Noticed the Good News?

Irony of ironies. On a day when the battle to save the value of the dollar in the pockets of US consumers seemed finally to be won, its value to everyone else sank. Inflation is yesterday's news, it appears, and the currency's fate is now driven by confidence and the uncertainties surrounding tariffs that are yet to affect prices.

The consumer price index data for March, announced Thursday morning, were about as good as anyone could have reasonably expected. This is how it broke down into its four main components, as tracked by the handy ECAN <GO> function on the terminal:


Food inflation ticked up a little, and politically sensitive eggs rose at 60.4% year on year, but overall core measures were remarkably healthy. Sticky prices, on products whose prices are difficult to move, dropped to the lowest rate since early 2022. The trimmed mean and median measures both fell, showing disinflation was broad-based, while the "supercore" measure of services excluding shelter, much emphasized by the Federal Reserve, has suddenly tumbled below 3%:

Shelter, central to the crisis in living costs and main driver of the overall index for the last two years, dropped below 4%; exclude it and the rest of the index is inflating at less than 2%:

If there is any carping to be done, it's that the reduced price pressure owes much to a slowdown in activity driven by the early actions and pronouncements of the Trump administration. Air fares fell, surprisingly, while hotels in the northeastern US had to reduce their rates — both probably attributable to Canadians' new-found aversion to visiting their neighbors to the south:

Put together with last week's employment numbers, which were also surprisingly strong, the economy is in better health than most had thought three months ago. Inflation is almost back within its target range and employment is still rising. How, then, to explain what happened to US markets in the hours after these numbers were released, and particularly to America's financial flagship, the dollar?

Confidence Game

When the US does something truly self-defeating and stupid, the natural response of currency traders is to seek an Alpine sanctuary. The Swiss franc is regarded as the safest of havens. So it's significant that the dollar just endured its worst day compared to the Swissie since 2015, falling more than 3% to take it to a level last touched during the debt ceiling debacle of August 2011. On that occasion, dysfunctional policymaking in Congress prompted Standard & Poor's to downgrade Treasury debt, and that briefly led to an exodus:

Essentially, the US very nearly decided to default on its debt when it didn't have to. The latest rush to the Swiss redoubt suggests that the market thinks that the Liberation Day tariffs, subsequently retracting some of them, and the scarcely credible 145% levies on Chinese goods constitute the stupidest acts of US economic policy since then. The selloff intensified in Asian trading. At one point, the dollar had dropped more than 5% since Wednesday's announced climbdown over reciprocal tariffs.

All of this after the good news that the dollar was retaining more of its value at home, thanks to lower inflation. More remarkably, the European economy is far weaker and the euro zone is under intense pressure — yet traders behaved as though the euro was almost as reliable a haven as the Swiss franc. The euro's surge has been remarkable since US Vice President JD Vance's speech to the Munich security conference suggested that the US-European alliance was over in its current form:

One logical explanation for a weakening dollar after strong inflation numbers would center on bond yields. All else equal, lower inflation makes it easier to cut rates, and will bring down short-term yields. The differential between two-year yields has been a key driver of the exchange rate and lower US yields should mean a weaker dollar. 

The problem with this theory is that the differential has widened sharply in the US favor of late. The dollar's slump has come as Treasury yields have risen sharply above German bunds — itself a remarkable occurrence only weeks after Germany committed to its biggest fiscal expansion in generations (largely in response to the Vance speech as it decided it could no longer treat Washington as a reliable ally):

Short-term yields are more important to the currency, but the move in longer bonds has been more startling. The real 30-year yield, as pure a measure of the cost of long-term money as exists, has now reached a high only previously seen during the spasm that followed the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008:

It's hard not to write about this in terms that sound apocalyptic. But it's also hard to cast this as anything other than a significant loss of confidence in the US. It doesn't have to be terminal. The shock of the debt-ceiling crisis in 2011 turned out to be a major turning point that was followed by a decade of American Exceptionalism. But the moves in the bond and currency markets — to a far greater extent than stocks (which by the way endured a massive selloff Thursday and gave up more than half of Wednesday's gains) — ram home that a lot is at stake. And the US is currently embarked on what appears to be a wholesale change in foreign policy, not struggling to get things back to normal as Barack Obama tried in 2011.

Getting back to normal isn't in the playbook. Photographer: Shawn Thew/EPA

How could this crisis of confidence come just as the US has come through its inflation trial? The problem is that almost all economic data is now coming off as backward-looking. Nobody cares. Similarly with the corporate earnings season, kicked off Friday morning by the big banks, there will be minimal interest in how things went in the first quarter. All now depends on what CEOs have to say about how they'll live in a new world in which the US and China have effectively imposed a trade embargo on each other.

Is anything more sinister afoot? It's possible that some large hedge fund is in trouble, and likely that central banks and sovereign wealth funds are having a role in driving these moves. That wouldn't necessarily be motivated by politics; they might simply and prudently be deciding to scale back exposure to the US. And as Points of Return has pointed out, international exposure to American assets is historically high, so such a move could go on for a while and become self-reinforcing.

Bears, Lions, Tigers — But No Bulls


Beyond trade conflicts, the US has a fight involving academe. And finance could be critical. Even the wealthiest schools are struggling to stand up to what many regard as Trump's blackmail to force policy changes in hiring and admissions, free speech, and "wokeness." Though backed by multibillion-dollar endowments, they have grudgingly either resorted to expenditure cuts or ceded to the president's demands. The administration has frozen funding for Columbia, Cornell, Northwestern and Princeton so far. Harvard faces potential losses of as much as $9 billion in grants and contracts unless it complies with a list of demands. What's preventing these elite schools from calling the president's bluff? One reason is that their massive endowments are illiquid.

Hamilton Hall at Columbia University a year ago. Photographer: Yuki Iwamura/Bloomberg

Schools face differing financial strain depending on their reliance on government support. Markov Processes International's analysis shows that about 37% of the biggest US endowments' assets are in private equity, which is generally illiquid:

Compounding this issue, elite institutions are already experiencing substantial liquidity pressures as they scramble to raise cash for private equity capital calls. The introduction of government funding cuts or freezes only exacerbates this situation because 60-70% of government grants are typically used to cover overhead on-campus costs.

For a fair assessment of the endowments' liquidity problem, consider that in the 2024 fiscal year, with the exception of Cornell, their private equity commitments far exceeded what they received from the federal government. This matters, because if those grants stop coming, PE capital calls and research funding will come into direct competition for endowments' cash:

MPI's Michael Markov warns that they could thus be forced to sell PE holdings on the secondary market at a discount. The current market turmoil is pushing investors to weigh whether a discount might make sense for them. After a historic drop in private equity assets, plunging by over 20% last year, dealmaking's wobbly start to 2025 means things don't look good.

Thus, even if endowments are looking to sell at a discount, they'd have to do so in a crowded space with many other sellers looking to free up liquidity in the $4 trillion industry. Suppose these schools opt against selling at a discount; they would then have to resort to options like scaling back on campus-related expenses and research initiatives, or even fresh borrowing, as Harvard intends. The latter choice could depend on how much risk a funding freeze poses to their operations.

This MPI chart shows the estimated government funds at risk on one axis, and the liquid proportion of their endowment on the other:

Columbia likely gave in to Trump's demands in part because financially it had to; as the chart shows, its exposure to the government far exceeds its peers. Even though the university has the lowest private equity allocation among the elite endowments, reliance on federal grants brings it to Harvard-Brown levels of overall liquidity stress. At Columbia and Cornell, grants exceed endowment spending by more than 50%:

The late David Swensen's Yale model used endowments' greater ability to take illiquidity risks to generate higher returns and set a template used by many others. It remains widely admired, yet has left schools prone to federal funding risks. With university finances under their greatest squeeze in generations, the downside of this approach is growing painfully obvious.

Richard Abbey

Survival Tips

Herewith another installment in our crowd-sourced tour of great detective fiction franchises. You might want to try: Abir Mukherjee's Wyndham and Banerjee series is set in India under the British Raj; the Canadian writer Eric Wright's John Salter series, set in Toronto; Philip Kerr's Bernie Gunther series, set in Nazi Germany; the Whitstable Pearl mysteries by Julie Wassmer (who used to be a scriptwriter for Eastenders so there are plenty of cliffhangers); Andrea Camilleri's Inspector Montalbano series, featuring Sicily and plenty of great food; and Death of a Red Heroine, the first of the Inspector Chen series by Qiu Xiaolong in contemporary Shanghai. This comes highly recommended by Andy Rothman of Sinology, long one of my favorite guides to all things China, and by remarkable coincidence I had picked up a copy of this book from a neighborhood bookshelf earlier this week. So that's what I'll read next. More detectives next week.

Have a good weekend everyone, and Chag Sameach for Passover (look out for the annual four questions next week) to our Jewish readers. 

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